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Foreign Ownership of Broadcasting:
The Telecommunications Act of 1996

and Beyond
ABSTRACT

In an increasinglyglobal market, severe restrictions upon
foreign investment in broadcasting companies have enabled
them to remain primarily domestic entities. This Note reviews
these restrictions and advocates reforming the world-wlde
system of broadcasting ownership regulation. This author
discusses the major policies underlying the current
regulationsand demonstrates their implications by looking at
several hypothetical regulatory schemes. The Note then
focuses upon regulatory systems that are currently being
used, as well as a hypothetical system based upon
reciprocity. In the process, the author reviews the ownership
restrictions of the United States, Canada, Australia, the
European Community, and several lesser-developed markets.
Finally, the Note weighs the various approaches currently
used and proposes an ideal system of regulationfor the
global broadcastingindustry.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The broadcasting industry has become a hotbed for mergers
and acquisitions activity' and legislative reform. 2
Wellestablished network leaders have sought new partners to help
them expand and increase revenues. 3
In the United States,
Congress has cooperated with this movement by enacting the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereinafter 1996 Act), which
removed many of the barriers that traditionally prohibited
1.
Steve Lohr, To Divide or Combine?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995 at Dl.
2.
See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56.
3.
For instance, the Walt Disney Co. merged with ABC, Westinghouse
merged with CBS, and Time Warner merged with Turner Broadcasting. Lohr,
supra note 1.
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communications companies from expanding into new sectors of
the Industry.4 From this flurry of activity, the message is clear:
being profitable in the 1990s requires forming the right
partnerships to win increased market share. In considering their
options, broadcasters must find partners who will bring in high
quality products to win over viewers and will supply the capital
Broadcasting6
needed to keep the network competitive. 5
companies should also search for areas ripe for expansion.
for new partners and offer
Foreign markets are a potential source
7
room.
expansion
and
capital
more
The move towards globalizing the broadcasting industry has
picked up support in recent years. 8 In the United States, for
instance, Congress attempted a limited deregulation of the

See 110 Stat. 56. This Act "opens up all telecommunications markets
4.
It basically allows
to full competition including local telephone and cable ....
telephone companies into cable, cable into telephone, and provides the necessary
competition that is going to benefit our consumers." 141 CONG. REc. H8281,
H8286 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Oxley). For a discussion of the
changes created by the 1996 Act and their expected impact upon the consumer,
see Jonathan E. Canis & Enrico C. Soriano, The Telecommunications Act of 1996:
A Global Analysis, 4 Comm. L. CONSPECTUS 147 (1996) and Changes in
Communication, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 1996, at 2B.
Upon signing the Act, President Clinton stated that "[tihis law is truly
revolutionary legislation that will bring the future to our doorstep. It will create
many, many high-wage jobs. It will provide for more information and more
entertainment to virtually every American home." Mike Mills, Ushering in a New

Age In Communications,WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1996, at Cl.
The need to look for new sources of capital and new markets is only
5.
going to increase. For instance, "[wlhen HDTV [High-Definition Television] does
arrive, broadcasters wishing to remain competitive will need capital to upgrade
much of their broadcasting equipment. Broadcasters can only get this infusion of
capital from abroad." Jeffrey Kowall. Foreign Investment Restrictions in Canadian
Television Broadcasting:A CallforReform, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 348, 349 (1993).
6.
See, e.g., S. Twiston Davies & Miguel Smirnoff, Time Warner Global
Movement Surfaces, Multichannel News, Dec. 6, 1993, at 73 (discussing Time
Warner recent activities overseas), availablein LEXIS, News Library, multnw File.
7.
See Thomas Joseph Cryan et al., Radlo for the 1990s: Legal Strategies
in an Emerging Global Marketplace, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 377, 378-79

(1991).
8.

In 1993, the U.S. Department of Commerce recommended removing

foreign ownership restrictions. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. ADMIN.
(NTIA), U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. No. 93-290, GLOBALIZATION OF THE
Similarly, in 1995, Rep. Mike Oxley (R-Ohio), the
MASS MEDIA at 90 (1993).
Chairman of the House Commerce Subcommittee and Vice Chairman of the
House Telecommunications Subcommittee, introduced legislation that would lift
the foreign ownership bans. Broadcastingas 'Commodity'; Dole Sees Regulation as
Gap with Democrats, Communications Daily, Mar. 9, 1995, at 1. Although the
measures did not pass, there was bipartisan support, as shown by comments
made by Rep. Boucher (D-Va.). See Communications Daily, Mar. 29, 1995, at 4;
Oxley Pushes Repeal of ForeignBroadcastOwnership Restrictions, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
12, 1995, Telecommunications Section.
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communications industry when it enacted the 1996 Act. 9 This
deregulation has done little to ease the barriers traditionally
encountered by foreign investors, however. 10 U.S. investors who
wish to invest in foreign broadcasting markets encounter similar
barriers, because, like the United States, most countries are
reluctant to allow foreign investors to gain any meaningful
influence in their broadcasting industries. 1
Some countries
12
follow policies reminiscent of the former Communist regimes
and completely prohibit foreigners from accessing their
airwaves.' 3 Others follow the lead of the United States and allow

9.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996). Passage of this legislation must have been a pleasant surprise for some,
such as Henry Geller who, in a recent article advocating reform, wrote "ilf
legislation is not passed in 1995, passage in 1996. an election year, Is dubious."
Henry Geller, Ownershlp Regulatory Policies in the U.S. Telecom Sector, 13 CARDOZo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 727, 748 (1995). Not all commentators agree, however, that this
legislation is the "deregulatory revolution" that it is hailed to be. Eli M. Noam,
Congress Sweeps It All Under One Big Top, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at B9.
10.
Although the 1996 Act may affect foreign ownership in other areas, the
Act maintains the level of restrictions on broadcasting imposed by the
Communications Act of 1934 with only slight modifications. § 403. 110 Stat. At
130-32 (1996).
11.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1934), amended by § 403, 110 Stat. At 13032; Broadcasting Act of 1990, ch. 42. sched. 2, part II (Eng.); Broadcasting
Services Act, 1992, 110 § 57 (Austl.). Traditionally, many countries have gone
further than the United States by setting quotas on the amount of foreign

materials that could be broadcast. See Laurence G.C. Kaplan, Comment, The
European Communlty's "Televislon Without Frontiers"Directive: Stimulating Europe
to Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 255. 294-302 (1994) (reviewing the
quotas imposed by many European countries prior to the adoption of the
"Television Without Frontiers" Directive).
Section 712 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations indirectly
addresses this issue. That provision provides that "[a] state Is responsible under
international law for injury resulting from... (3) other arbitrary or discriminatory
acts or omissions by the state that impair property or other economic interests of
a national of another state." Although "the right to establish oneself in business"
is included in the rights of nationals in the territory of another state, this right is
"subject to the right of the host state to exclude aliens from certain 'sensitive'
businesses such as communications." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 712 reporter note 12 (1987).
12.
See Michael J. Bazyler & Eugene Sadovoy, Government Regulation and
Privatization of Electronic Mass Media in Russia and the Other Former Soviet
Republics, 14 WHITTIER L. REv. 427, 427-42 (1993) (describing the evolution of the
mass media from the Communist Party domination under the Soviet Union to the
current state of governmental influence in the former Soviet Republics).
13.
Until recently, few countries, outside of the United States, have
allowed private organizations to control broadcasting facilities. Patricia Diaz
Dennis, Telecommunications in the '90s-From Wasteland to Global Network, 11
B.U. INT'L L.J. 133, 154 (1993). For example, while the mass media in China has
experienced a trend towards more honest reporting covering a wider variety of
issues, the media channels are still dominated and controlled by the Communist
Party. See WON HO CHANG, MASS MEDIA INCHINA: THE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE 4558 (1989). On the other hand, Cuba, under the communist dictatorship of Fidel
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some outside investment but severely limit the amount of foreign
ownership. 14 Thus, the globalization movement has run into a
wall of protectionism.
Whatever their form, these protectionist regulations are
suppressing a potential media boom around the world. 15
Although implementation of meaningful reform in the area of
foreign ownership restrictions on broadcasting may seem remote,
efforts to remove the draconian restrictions are already
underway. 16 With the recent push for reforming and rewriting
the communications laws, now is the time to study the benefits
and feasibility of a new regulatory regime.
This Note examines foreign investment in the television
broadcasting industry with an emphasis on providing a
meaningful recommendation to the U.S. Congress on how to
achieve an open, global television broadcasting market. 17 Part II
analyzes the spectrum of governmental control over broadcasting
by focusing on the extreme levels of regulation and the policies
underlying the regulations.' 8 This discussion will demonstrate

Castro, has seen a move towards allowing some joint ventures with foreign
investors, including some from the United States, in the communications
industries. Hopeton S. Dunn & Felipe Noguera, Cuban Telecommunications
Systems, In GLOBALIZATION. COMMUNICATIONS AND CARIBBEAN IDENTITY 185. 194-96
(Hopeton S. Dunn ed. 1995).
14.
Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 limits foreign investors
to a maximum of 20% direct ownership of companies holding a broadcasting
license and 25% ownership of a holding company that controls a company with a
broadcasting license. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) 3 & 4. For examples of other countries
following this type of approach and limiting foreigners to a specific maximum
percentage of ownership, see the Broadcasting Services Act, 1992. 110 § 57
(Austl.) (limiting foreigners to 15% control individually or 20% collectively of
Australian broadcast licenses), and the Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1968, 376
C.R.C. §§ 2-4 (1978) (limiting foreign investment in Canadian companies with
broadcasting licenses to 20%).
15.
See 141 CONG. REc. H8281, H8286 (daily ed. Aug. 2. 1995) (statement
of Rep. Oxley) (noting that a modernization of foreign ownership restrictions is
necessary to make American companies "more competitive in a global economy").
See Communications Act of 1995, S. 652, 104th Cong. § 303: see also
16.
H.R. 514, 104th Cong. § 1(a) (1995) (attempting to repeal all of the restrictions
imposed by section 310(b) of the Communications Act of 1934).
17.
The focus of this Note is on broadcasting through the airwaves. Using
cable as an alternative source for foreigners to transmit signals will not be a
primary concern given the more relaxed standard that countries such as the
United States and Canada have imposed upon cable ownership. See generally

Colin J. Coffey, Note, ForeignInvestment In Cable Television: The United States and
Canada, 6 HASTINGS INT'I & COMP. L. REv. 399 (1983) (arguing for a tightening of
ownership restrictions): Mary Louise Brown, Note, Direct Foreign Investment In

Cable Television Systems: An Analysis of Allen Ownersh(p in the Context of the
United States and Canada,10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 113 (1983).
18.
At first, this discussion will most likely appear to be unrelated to the
ultimate issue of foreign investment in the broadcasting industry. This analysis,
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the economic attractiveness of an open system 19 but show the
necessity of maintaining some minimal level of regulation. Part III
evaluates various philosophies of regulation to determine the
appropriate level of regulation for a uniform, world-wide standard.
This discussion consists of case studies of the actual regulations

of selected countries and a review of hypothetical alternatives. In
addition, the broadcasting restrictions in the United States are
analyzed in light of Section 310 of the Communications Act of
1934, the recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
decision regarding Fox Television, 20 and the minimal changes to
the foreign ownership restrictions made by the 1996 Act. Finally,
Part IV suggests that a reciprocity-based, global relaxation of
broadcasting ownership regulations is the desirable result. This
system of regulation would open up economic opportunities
around the world, while maintaining safeguards to protect
national security. The United States should take the lead in
removing its own protectionist barriers in order to achieve such
an open market.
II.

THE SPECTRUM OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROLS:

THE POLICIES AND

THE TWO EXTREMES

The levels of government regulation of foreign investment in
the worldwide broadcasting industry range from the extreme of
complete control of all broadcasting activity 21 to a policy of
laissez-faire. 2 2 As a result of a recent trend away from statecontrolled broadcasting and towards a privatized system, 23 most

however, is essential as a starting point for considering approaches to regulation
that are currently being used.
19.
Within the context of this Note, an "open system" will be defined as one
in which all those who wish to participate In the industry by investing in

broadcasting companies are able to do so.
20.
In re Application of Fox Television Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714. (F.C.C.
1995) availablein Westlaw, 1995 WL 447416.
21.
Most countries around the world have few privately held broadcasting
companies. Id. Dennis, supra note 13, at 154. In fact, the United States Is the
only country where the broadcasting Industry began under private control.
22.
"Laissez-faire" is a "hands-off" policy where the government allows for
the market to operate relatively free of regulations. See BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY
876 (6th ed. 1990).
23.
Stephen R. Konlgsberg, Think Globally, Act Locally: North American
Free Trade, Canadian Cultural Industry Exemption, and the Liberalization of
Broadcast Ownership Laws, 12 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 311 (1994).
Examples of countries following this trend include Great Britain, France, Spain,
Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Mexico. Id. at 311 n.187; Brent Lee Vannoy.
Comment Mexican Telecommunications: Privatizationand NAFTA Open the Doorfor
U.S. Expansion into Mexican Markets, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 312-17 (1994).
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countries impose regulations somewhere in between these two
extremes. 2 4 Analyzing these approaches can help determine an
ideal approach for a world-wide system of regulation.
An
optimum level of regulation maximizes economic opportunities
and free speech, while
minimizing the risks to national security
25
and independence.
A. The Cast of Characters

There are four main policies regarding the analysis of an
approach to regulating foreign investment: free speech, national
security,
economic
opportunities,
and
governmental
independence. 2 6 Each policy is important, and each often will
conflict with the others. 27 Before looking at the impact of the
various theories of regulation,
a brief introduction to the goals of
28
each policy is warranted.

This trend, however, has not included a move towards relaxing the barriers of
foreign investment in the broadcasting industry.
24.
There is no limit to the number of methodologies that governments can
adopt to regulate broadcasting inside their own borders. As far as foreign
ownership restrictions, these possibilities include total bans on foreigners,
limiting foreigners influence, and allowing only the most favored of foreigners to
invest.
25.
Cecelia M. Waldeck, Proposalsfor Limiting Foreign Investment Risk
Under the Exon-FlorloAmendment, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1190 (1991).
26.
As with any regulatory policy, there are countless other considerations,
such as protecting one's own industries from unfair competition, that will factor
into the mix. These other factors, whenever relevant, will be taken into account.
Most will be sufficiently handled in the discussion of the four main policies
enumerated.
27.
For instance, as the U.S. Supreme Court decisions note, there is often
a strong tension between free speech and its effects on national security. See,
e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding convictions for
distributing anti-war leaflets in violation of the Sedition Act of 1917); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the Smith Act of 1940 which made
it unlawful to advocate the overthrow of the government); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (limiting state ability to proscribe speech to
instances directed at inciting lawless action).
28.
These policies are primarily local in scope because they focus upon the
effects of a course of action upon an individual country. When trying to achieve a
global system that is good for everyone, the optimal balance of these policies must
be considered from many perspectives since the current state of the United States
is not indicative of the world at large. The optimal balance for the United States,
however, should be close to the proper balance for the other industrialized
countries of the world. Third-world countries that do not have a broadcasting
industry to speak of will not factor into the optimal mix because the lack of
popular access to the media severely lessens any risks that foreigners would be
able to enter and exert undue influence in the market.
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Free speech is a critical element of a democratic society that
demands protection. 29 Judge Learned Hand once observed that
"in the end it is worse to suppress dissent than to run the risk of
heresy."30
When a government selects who may control the
means of mass communication by setting licensing requirements,
the government assumes that risk.
Indeed, most licensing
decisions are not conscious ones to exclude a specific dissenting
view. But many of those decisions, such as the one to severely
restrict foreign investment, have that undesirable effect. 3 '
Justice Brennan acknowledged that "Islafeguarding the public's
right to receive a diversity of views and information over the
airwaves is . . . an integral component of the FCC's (Federal
Communications Commission's) mission."32 Because the value of
the "[p]ress is to interpret, criticize, analyze, and supply vital
information to citizens so that they can make their own
determinations about how best to set national, state, and local
policies,"3 3 the government should be wary of taking actions that
34
will either stifle or promote potential speakers and their views.
Obstructing a message through licensing runs counter to the

policies behind the First Amendment and its foreign equivalents
across the world. 3 5
29.

Therefore, the government should look for

U.S. CONST. Amend. I. See also Kaplan, supra note 11, at 337 ("Politics

and democracy... are linked Intimately with publicity, and Indirectly, but no less
importantly, with program diversity.").
30.
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE, 657 (1994)
(quoting Judge Hand).
31.
In opposing the renewal of the licenses for Fox Television, the NAACP
claimed that minorities and other political outsiders were being denied access to
the mass media because of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. See In re
Applicatlon of Fox Television Stations, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 5714 (F.C.C. 1995), 1995
WL 447416, 12. The NAACP's opposition was based primarily upon Its belief
that renewing Fox's license would hurt future minority opportunities. Id. The
NAACP did not argue that the FCC's rules were established for the purpose of
exclusion.
32.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 567 (1990), overruled
by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S.Ct 2097 (1995).
33.
L. A. Powe, Jr., Or of the [Broadcast]Press, 55 TEX. L. REV. 39 (1976)
reprintedIn ERIC BARENDT, MEDIA LAW (1993).
34.
"The obvious danger Is that government persuaders will come to
disrespect citizens and their role of ultimate decider, and manipulate them by
communicating only what makes them accede to government's plans, policies,
and goals." Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of
Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581. 584 (1984) (quoting MARX J. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION INAMERICA, (1983)).
35.
The Supreme Court specifically condemned such a practice when It
wrote: "[Tlhe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 48-49 (1976). For a
complete First Amendment analysis of restrictions on broadcasting, see L. A.
Powe, Jr., supra note 34f Lee C. Bollinger, Jr. Freedom of the Press and Public
Access: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV.
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ways to remove those barriers to political outsiders, and thus

increase

the

opportunities
36

for

"outsiders" to

express

their

messages and views.
Countering the policy of free speech is the need for national
security. National security is often the justification for refusing to

allow foreigners to gain any meaningful influence over
broadcasting. 37 At one time, a hostile group could interfere,
block, or intercept the confidential communications of the
military. 38 Today, by having open access to the public, an enemy
can subvert the integrity of the government or an ongoing military
operation.3 9 The severe restrictions regarding the amount of
foreign broadcasting ownership allowed in those countries that do
allow any involvement demonstrate this fear of foreign
influence.

40

Another policy often provided as the justification for imposing
regulations on broadcasting refers to the independence of
sovereign states. 4 1 The fear is that "subtle invasions of foreign

1 (1976) reprinted in BARENDT. supra note 34; Ian M. Rose, Note, Barring
Foreignersfrom Our Airwaves: An Anachronistic Pothole on the Global Information
Highway. 95 CoLuM. L. REV. 1188 (1995).

36.
For instance, the creation of a fourth network has given many
speakers, including many minorities that are typically left out of the normal
media, a new, national forum for their ideas and productions. In re Application of
Fox Television Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995 WL 447416 (F.C.C. 1995)
(separate statement of James Quello) (discussing the benefits provided from the
Australian-owned Fox Television Network). See also Geller, supra note 9, at 72930 (discussing the value of diversity of viewpoints); Eli M. Noam & Lisa M.
Domonkos, Television Self-Regulatlon and Ownership Regulation: The American
Experlence, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 645, 651 (1995) ("The point of an open
media system is only partly to provide more entertainment. The other important
part is to provide diversity and choice.").
37.
Security concerns originally led to the enactment of foreign ownership
limits on broadcasting in the United States. James G. Ennis & David N. Roberts,
Foreign Ownership in U.S. CommunicationsIndustry: The Impact of Section 310, 19
INTL Bus. L. 243 (1991).
38.
Id. at 243-44.

39.
See cases cited supra note 27 (illustrating the United States fear of
anti-government activities). Although these cases did not involve the mass media,
such involvement would probably have intensified the fear.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (limiting foreign investors to a maximum
40.
of 20% direct ownership of companies with a broadcasting license and 25%
ownership of a holding company that controls a company with a broadcasting
license); Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, 110 § 57 (Austrl.) (limiting foreigners to
15% control individually or 20% collectively of Australian broadcast licenses);
Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1968, 376 C.R.C. §§ 2-4 (1978) (limiting foreign
investment in Canadian companies with broadcasting licenses to 20%).
41.
State sovereignty is one of the chief reasons given for the development
of state-run broadcasting stations in Europe. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 261-62.
But see Kowall, supra note 5, at 357-58 (questioning the national unity and
cultural sovereignty arguments for protecting the broadcasting industry from
outsiders).

826

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:817

popular culture can infiltrate a nation and change the very fabric
from which it is made."42 Certainly, no country is willing to give

up control of its own borders

in the name of economic

opportunities. Similarly, no country wants to allow foreigners to
dominate the thought, culture, and activities of its citizens by
exerting excessive control over the mass media. 43 Any proposal
that would require a country to subordinate its national Identity
and independence would be unacceptable. Balancing concerns
over independence and control is an important part of achieving
an ideal system of regulating foreign ownership of broadcasting
44
licenses.
Restrictions on foreign investment in the broadcasting
industry reflect a careful balancing of freedom and security. The
primary reason for upsetting this balance is to increase the
economic opportunities that are presently available. 45
As
evidenced by the recent flurry of merger activity, 46 many
communications companies are looking for new alternatives to
improve the quality of their services and to increase
profitability. 4 7 The value of new opportunities consists of more
48
competition, reduced costs to the consumer, and more jobs.
Opening new markets offers business opportunities to increase
the level of operations, to derive the benefits typically associated
with economies of scale, 49 and to obtain new sources of capital.5 0

42.

Kaplan, supra note 11, at 263.

43.

Fears over the "Americanization" of its culture led Canada to exclude

the entertainment industries from NAFTA's overall relaxation of trade restrictions
with the United States. Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 284. See also Brown, supra
note 17, at 117.
This fear is heightened because high-quality television
programming from the United States can be purchased by Canadian broadcasters
at a cost substantially lower than the cost of producing their own, lower-quality
programs. MARY ViPoND, THE MASS MEDIA IN CANADA 74 (1989). European
countries have also expressed concern about the dominance of American
broadcasters. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 255, 262, 269-71.
44.
See lnfra Part III.
45.
See Rose, supra note 35, at 1226 (stating that a relaxation of
ownership restrictions can lead to more opportunities in foreign media markets,
new sources of capital, and an improvement in the quality of programming).
46.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 4.
47.
A primary goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to allow
companies in the communications industry to expand into one another's
businesses.
See 141 CONG. REc. H8281, H8286 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Oxley); see also Joseph A. Pantoja, Note, Desirable Economic
Cooperation Among High-Technology Industries: A Look at Telephone and Cable,
1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 617 (discussing the value of removing these industrybased barriers).
48.
See 141 CONG. Rc. H8286 (predicting that deregulation could lead to
annual savings of between thirty and fifty dollars in consumer costs as well as
creating 3.5 million new Jobs).
49.
Broadcasters would be able to benefit by economies of scale when they
are able to produce the same product or television show for several markets as
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In the end, more providers of services will lead to more consumer
choices, reduced costs 5 for air time, and less-monopolistic
practices by broadcasters. '
B. One Extreme: Total Government Control of Broadcasting
Although an exclusively state-run broadcasting industry "sets
off alarms in the American mind, and conjures up images of an
Orwellian Big Brother and his propaganda," many parts of the
world feel that "this Big Brother is welcomed and respected for his
efforts." 5 2 Unlike its development in the United States, the
broadcasting industries of most countries evolved under the
control of the government. 5 3 While there has been a movement
towards allowing private broadcasting stations in some parts of
Europe-including the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal,

well as when they would be able to use the same satellite network to transmit
broadcasting signals. Although language barriers may hamper the benefits of the
first, see Kaplan, supra note 11, at 268 (noting that, by 1990, less than 10% of
EC programming was viewed in other member states), the ability to consolidate
facilities could greatly reduce costs for the broadcaster.
In Canada, the broadcasting industry has become concentrated in the hands
of a few broadcasters due to the economies of scale and the limits on foreign
investors. See VIPOND, supra note 43. By eliminating national barriers, the
monopolistic characteristics would begin to disappear because more broadcasters
would be able to derive their own benefits of increased economies of scale by
tapping into other markets and additional sources of capital.
Although liberalizing ownership restrictions will open up many new
50.
capital sources by enabling foreigners to invest in broadcasting entities, this
opening will not necessarily cause a free-for-all in the investment communities
since these broadcasters must abide by applicable securities regulations. See,
e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d. Cir. 1968) (finding that the
courts had jurisdiction over a cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5 even though the
charges were brought against a foreign entity for actions occurring outside the
United States because those actions were likely to have a detrimental effect upon
American investors investing on the American Stock Exchange). While a full
discussion of the effects of securities regulations upon a company's ability to raise
capital is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to understand that these

regulations place additional costs upon the issuers of securities in an effort to
protect the investors. Therefore, while the sources of capital are increased, not all
broadcasters will want to target every possible investment market, since, in that
process. they may be subjecting themselves to the additional costs.
The reduced cost of air-time could be passed on to advertisers in the
51.
form of lower prices for advertising. This would also make that broadcaster more
attractive to potential advertisers. In addition, if a broadcaster charges customers
for its services, as many cable and movie stations do, the cost to the consumers
for those services would decrease as a result of the broadcaster's desire to outperform its competition.
See Kaplan, supra note 11, at 260; accord Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior
52.
Restraint. Original Intentions and Modern Interpretation, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV.
439 (1987) ("People generally associate state control of the news media with
repressive regimes in other nations.").
Dennis, supra note 13, at 154.
53.
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and Italy-that move has not been universal. 54 Some nations still
solely adhere to the old philosophy of government-run

broadcasting. 55 Not only is this the most extreme governmental
response to foreigners wishing to enter the industry, it also shows
a distrust by governments of the citizens of their own countries.
This approach, however, offers the most protection for the
physical security of a country.5 6 Under such a restrictive policy,
the government can minimize concern over threats to national
security and' independence because it has complete authority to
set the agenda for broadcasters. If a message exists that the
government does not support, the government could simply
censor that statement.
That security, however, comes with a very high cost. First,
and most importantly, such a restrictive policy sacrifices the
freedom of expression. With the government in complete control,
no alternative messages will be heard. No opportunity exists to
shed light on wrongdoings by the government.
Instead,
broadcasters are forced to disperse messages, no matter how
incorrect, that further the government's agenda.57 Without a
second, independent station to cleanse its audience by offering
non-biased, accurate news reports, this danger will become a
reality. In a democratic society, where the free exchange of Ideas
and opinions is essential to making informed decisions, this
58
situation would be intolerable.
C. The Other Extreme: Laissez-Faire

The polar opposite of total government domination of
broadcasting is the hands-off approach known as laissez-faire.
Under this theory, the broadcasting market operates free of
governmental interference and regulation.
Only the market
regulates the industry. This approach calls for no restrictions on
the amount of control that foreigners have over the broadcasting

54.
Konigsberg, supranote 23, at 311 n.187.
55.
See DAVID B. WINN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW
179-80 (1994) (discussing the retention of a state monopoly on broadcasting in
both Sweden and Italy).
56.
The "physical security of a country" refers to the continued existence of
that nation as an ongoing entity. It does not refer to the freedom of that nation's
citizens.
57.
Carter, supra note 34.
58. 'Although the picture painted by this discussion may be that of the
extreme, without a check on the government's influence, this picture could easily
become a reality.
All government broadcasting is not suspect as mere
propaganda, however. The quality and success of public television in the United

States and in England shows that government can, in fact, be a responsible
broadcaster.
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Not even any licensing
industry in a particular country.
requirements would exist.
No country follows this model completely. 59 As a practical
matter, this approach could lead to chaos because broadcasters
would be able to interfere or block each other's signals by
transmitting messages on the same frequency. 60 In fact, the
possibility of foreigners using broadcasting stations to block
military communications was the specific reason that led to the
original limits on foreign involvement in the U.S. broadcasting
industry.6 1 Although technological advances have alleviated this
threat to some degree,6 2 the possibility of one broadcaster
interfering with another remains. 63 Even though the laissez-faire
approach is impractical as a regulatory scheme, analyzing this
approach is helpful in studying the implications of relaxing
foreign ownership regulations.

Besides the possibility that a foreign broadcaster would be
able to threaten a country's national security by blocking
confidential military communications, there is a realistic
possibility that the airwaves could be used to oppose
governmental policies. A broadcaster could, in theory, transmit
misleading information about the government in an effort to
subvert support for that government.
The previous argument, however, is not very persuasive given
the realities of a truly open system. Other stations, presumably
under the control of different groups, would remain free to
broadcast their own views of a situation. In effect, opening the
airwaves will have a cleansing effect because these other
broadcasters could disseminate their own view of the truth. As
long as more than one station broadcasts its message, a system
that allows relatively free access to the airwaves will have a
There has, however, been a move towards a reduction of restrictions in
59.
many parts of the world. See generally WINN, supranote 55 (discussing media law
in the European Community).
See Cryan, supra note 7, at 392 (discussing the chaos that ensued
60.
from France's privatization of its radio broadcasting industry before it enacted
As the government begins to take simple, nonlicensing requirements).
suppressive measures, such as designating the frequency upon which a
broadcaster can transmit, this threat of blocking will disappear.
Ennis & Roberts. supra note 37, at 243-44.
61.
Technological advances that have allowed for a more efficient use of
62.
the broadcasting spectrum as well as new methods of transferring signals have

greatly reduced the ability of broadcasters to block each other. Rose, supra note
35, at 1201-03. See also Cryan, supra note 7, at 381-87 (discussing technological

advances in the area of radio broadcasting).
A real world illustration of this phenomenon, most often associated
63.
with radio broadcasts, can be seen (or heard) when the signals from broadcast
stations begin to conflict with others as the listener nears the end of the signal's

zone of reception. This conflict often results in static or, even worse, two
broadcasts being heard at the same time.
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reduced risk of citizens being misled into jeopardizing their own
freedoms or the independence of their country.
The laissez-faire approach to governmental regulations in the
broadcasting industry is the approach most supportive of the
ideals of free speech in a democratic society. This argument is
straight forward: By increasing the access to the airwaves, a
larger forum exists for all individuals to express their point of
view, regardless of their position. Some factors, such as the
prohibitive cost of starting one's own broadcasting station or
disagreements in ideological philosophy with those operating
broadcasting facilities, may limit access to some speakers. Such
barriers, however, would not change the reality that the overall
size of the forum has increased.

Finally, a larger broadcasting forum increases the economic.
opportunities for investors. Broadcasting companies would have
easier access to capital, including capital from foreign sources,
which would enable the company to upgrade its facilities, improve
the quality of the shows it broadcasts, and reach new
audiences. 6 4 Advertisers would benefit from having more choice
over where to display their goods and from the natural decrease
in the costs associated with an increase in the supply of airtime.6 5 And, in theory, there are vast amounts of other new
economic opportunities that would become available, of which
those mentioned above comprise just a small sample.
In 1944, Judge Learned Hand presented his now famous
Spirit of Liberty address in which he remarked that 1[a] society in
which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes
66
a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few."
This observation holds true for a broadcasting industry operating
under the laissez-faire approach. Although the advantages of this
approach are great, the possibility of interference with
broadcasting signals makes this approach unworkable, since It
encourages the largest broadcasters (the savage few) to use their
superior transmitters and resources for the oppression of the
minority.
Therefore, some regulation is necessary.
As one
commentator recently explained, one cannot "assume that
liberalization and regulation are mutually exclusive. '67 After all,

64.
See Kowall, supra note 5, at 349.
65.
See VIPOND, supra note 43, at 90.
66.
Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, (1944), reprinted in LEARNED HAND.
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189, 190 (Irving DiUllard ed. 1952). Hand delivered these
remarks at the "I am an American Day" celebration in New York's Central Park as
part of the ceremony honoring new American citizens at a time when American
soldiers were fighting for "liberty" against the oppressive regime of Hitler's
Germany. Id.
67.
Kaplan, supra note 11. at 294-95.
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where we please ....
while "we are free to drive
68
the rules of the road."

we must still obey

III. POINTS IN BETWEEN: VARIOUS APPROACHES TO REGULATING
OWNERSHIP OF BROADCASTING AROUND THE WORLD

Several approaches and philosophies that fall in between the
two extremes discussed above have been developed for regulating
foreign involvement in a country's broadcasting industry. A study
of these approaches reveals many insights that can be
incorporated into an optimal system of global regulation.
A. The PercentageMethod
Perhaps the most common method of regulating foreign
involvement in broadcasting consists of setting a maximum
percentage of foreign ownership. This approach draws a bright
line so that, in theory, it is relatively easy to apply. Many
Australia, and Canada,
countries, including the United States,
6 9
have followed this type of approach.
1. The United States Under the Communications Act of 1934

a. The History and Current State of FCC Regulation

"Historically, the United States has advocated an open door
policy toward foreign investment."70 Limitations on the amount of
control and influence foreigners have over the broadcasting
industry in the United States, however, is nothing new. These
71
restrictions date back to the earliest days of radio broadcasting.
In the Radio Act of 1912, Congress provided that broadcasting
licenses could be given only to citizens of the United States and
Puerto Rico. 72 The President was also given the authority to seize

Id. at 295.
68.
See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1934) amended by Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 403
69.
(1996); Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, § 57 (Austrl.); Canadian Broadcasting
Act of 1968, 376 C.R.C. §§ 2-4 (1978).
Waldeck, supra note 25, at 1181.
70.
71.
At the urging of the United States Navy, Congress first restricted alien
ownership of broadcasting facilities in the Radio Act of 1912. Ennis & Roberts,
supra note 37, at 243 (citing the Act of 13 August, 1912, ch. 287, § 2, 37 Stat.
302 (1912)). This measure was taken to alleviate the Navy's fear that foreigners
would be able to use radio facilities to disrupt or intercept vital communications
during times of war. Id.
Id.
72.
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73
radio facilities in times of war or other national emergencies.
These regulations were enacted in an effort to protect national
security. 74
Congress feared that a foreign entity could use
broadcast facilities in the United States to block the
communications of the Navy, to disseminate important military
information to the enemy, or to undermine the support of the
This set of
people in the government's ongoing efforts. 7 5
regulations
did
not
directly
address
the
ownership
of
broadcasting
76
facilities.
Once Congress realized that restricting the holding of a
license, by itself, would not eliminate these perceived threats, the
regulations were tightened. 7 7 Current restrictions, which were
enacted as part of the Communications Act of 1934,78 include a
complete prohibition on granting a license to any foreigner, 79 as
well as limits on the level of foreign investment in corporations
that directly or indirectly control broadcast licenses.8 0 Because of
Id. During the early days of World War I, before the United States
73.
became involved, President Wilson exercised his authority under this provision,
and ordered the seizure of two German-owned broadcasting facilities in New York
after those stations transmitted messages that were not consistent with the
United States policy of neutrality. Id. at 243-44.
74.
Rose, supra note 35. at 1195.
75.
Ennis & Roberts, supra note 37.
76.
Id. at 243.
77.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b).
78.
These restrictions first appeared in the Radio Act of 1927. Ennis and
Roberts, supra note 37, at 244. Later, Congress incorporated them as part of the

Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 310.
79.
80.

47 U.S.C. § 310(a).
§ 310. License Ownership Restrictions
(a)

Grant to or holding by foreign government or representative.
The station license required under this chapter shall not be
granted to or held by any foreign government or the representative
thereof.
(b)
Grant to or holding by alien or representative, foreign
corporation, etc.
No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or
aeronautical fixed radio station license shall be granted to or held
by(1)
any alien or the representative of any alien;
(2)
any corporation organized under the laws of any
foreign government;
(3)
any corporation of which any officer or director is
an alien or of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is
owned of record or voted by aliens or their representatives or by a
foreign government or representative thereof or by any corporation
organized under the laws of a foreign country;
(4)
any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by
any other corporation of which any officer or more than one-fourth
of the directors are aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the
capital stock is owned of record or voted by aliens, their
representatives, or by a foreign government or representative
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these restrictions, no foreign company had been able to gain
control of a broadcast license in the United States until 1995
when the FCC waived the limitations for Fox broadcasting. 8 '
Under section 310(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as

amended by the 1996 Act, 8 2 the United States regulates foreign

investment

through

the

use

of

a

two-tiered

percentage

approach.8 3 Section 310(b)(3) limits direct foreign control over
corporations with broadcasting licenses to twenty percent.8 4 This
limit on direct investment includes the aggregate of all direct and
indirect, non-controlling interests in the licensee.8 5 Additionally,
under Section 310(b)(4), foreigners are allowed to hold up to a
twenty-five percent interest in a holding or parent company that
controls a licensee.8 6 This second limitation can be waived if the
FCC concludes that it is in the public interest to do so. 87 In
thereof, or by any corporation organized under the laws of a
foreign country, if the Commission finds that the public interest
will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license.
47 U.S.C. § 310 (prior to 1996 Act). The 1996 Act amended § 310 to eliminate the
bar against companies with foreign directors. Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 403(k)(1)-(2), 110 Stat. 56, 130-32.
Section 310(b) and several other provisions of Title 47 of the U.S. Code
-impose[] certain obligations and restrictions only on those stations that engage in
'broadcasting.'" National Association for Better Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 849 F.2d
665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Broadcasting is defined as the "dissemination of radio
communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the
intermediary of relay stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1995). "[Tlhe determination of
whether a station is engaged in broadcasting can at times be critical. In making
must look to the licensee's intent."
the Commission ...
the determination ....
849 F.2d at 666. As a result of these statutes, many activities such as the
operation of private radio services are excluded from the coverage of the foreign
ownership restrictions. Andrew C. Barrett & Byron F. Merchant, Emerging

Technologies and PersonalCommunications Services: Regulatory Issues, 1 COMM.
L. CONSPECTUS 3, 13 (1993).
Despite Fox's efforts at creative financing, the FCC found that Fox was
81.
owned almost entirely by the Australian News Corp. In re Application of Fox
Television Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995 WL 447416, 13-18 (F.C.C. 1995).
82.
Although the 1996 Act amended section 310(b), it has not removed the
two-tiered approach. The 1996 Act removed the bar against foreign directors
from section 310(b). See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 §
403, 110 Stat. 56, 130-32.
83.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(3)-(4).
47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(3).
84.
Ronald W. Gavillet, Jill M. Foehrkolb, and Simone Wu. Structuring
85.
Foreign Investments In FCC Licensees Under Section 310(b) of the Communications
Act, 27 CAL. W. L. REv. 7, 11 (1990). An indirect, non-controlling interest is an
investment in a company that holds investments in a licensee. Id. In calculating
how much an indirect, non-controlling interest will count towards the twenty
percent maximum, the FCC employs a multiplier equal to the percentage of the
foreign investment in the holding company multiplied by the percentage of the
holding company's investment in the licensee. Id. at 11-12.
86.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4).
87.
Id.
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determining whether a licensee is in compliance with these
ownership restrictions, Section 310(b)(3) and Section (b)(4) are
treated separately; they are not aggregated.8 8
With a little
creativity, a foreign investor could, in theory, obtain a forty

percent interest in a licensee in the United States.8 9 Because the
previously discussed "limitations on alien ownership, voting
rights, and directorships .... [do not], [a]s the Commission is well
aware .... always reflect reality,"90 a foreign investor with a large
enough interest may be subject to additional regulations if that
91
investor is found to exercise defacto control over the licensee.
Although the ownership regulations appear rigid, the "public
interest" exception to the indirect ownership limit of Section
310(b)(4) gives the FCC broad discretion to waive the
requirements of the statute. 9 2 Allowance of this exception by the
FCC, however, has been rare. 93 For the first time ever, in the
1995 Fox Television decision, the FCC granted a public interest
waiver to allow a foreign owner to maintain control of a television
broadcasting license. 94 In Fox, the Commission found that the
Australian-based News Corporation, which is the alter-ego of
media-mogul Rupert Murdock, had ownership interests in excess
of Section 310's indirect ownership limits.9 5 Under the facts of
the case, however, the Commission determined that "equity"
required granting a public interest waiver. 96 At first blush, this

88.

Gavillet, supra note 85, at 19.

89.

A foreign investor could directly own 20% of the licensee as well as

25% interest in a corporation that controls the licensee. If the controlling
corporation owns the remaining 80% of the licensee (100% - the foreign investors
20%). the foreign investor will have an additional 20% investment in the licensee,
as computed by the FCC multiplier (80X 25), thereby giving the foreigner a 40%
interest. Id. at 40.
90.
Telemundo, Inc. v. F.C.C., 802 F.2d 513, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
91.
Gavillet, supra note 85, at 20-22.
92.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4). Section 310(b)(4) calls for a case-by-case
analysis looking at several factors including "(1) whether the alien's country of
citizenship enjoys close and friendly relations with the United States, (2) the
extent of foreign ownership or control of the corporation .... (3) whether the
licensed facility involved is passive in nature ....
(4) the qualifications of the

applicant," and other additional factors. Gavillet, supra note 85, at 17-18. There
is no corresponding flexibility in the direct ownership limit imposed by 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b)(3).
93.
See Gavillet, supra note 85, at 14-15.
94.
In re Application of Fox Television Stations, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995
WL 447416 (F.C.C. 1995).

95.
Id. M13-18. After considering "the economic realities of the (situation]
under review and not simply the labels attached by the parties to their corporate
incidents," the Commission determined that the News Corporation's debt interest
in Fox was "more properly characterized as a capital contribution." Id. 9V14-15.
This interest exceeded the limit of § 310(b)(4). Id. 19.
96.
The Commission considered many factors including Fox Television's
good faith reliance upon its understanding of Section 310(b), the costs that
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decision appears to provide a precedent for other foreign investors
to argue that they too should be allowed to gain indirect control of
a broadcasting license. That conclusion, however, is not justified
because Fox was decided based upon the equities of that case,

and not because the public interest was furthered by allowing this
"foreigner" into the broadcasting industry.9 7 The Fox decision
concerned the unfairness of terminating broadcasting licenses
held by a foreign corporation after that corporation held those
98
Because
licenses with the FCC's blessing for over a decade.
there is little chance that any other foreigner will be able to enter
the U.S. television broadcasting market, and gain a substantial
foothold as Fox did, it is doubtful that the Fox decision will be
repeated under the present regulations.
b. Evaluation of the U.S. Regulations: Are the Regulations Valid?
The U.S. foreign ownership restrictions suffer from two flaws:
the national security justification for those provisions is
overstated and the benefits of foreign capital are underestimated.
(i) The Weakness of the National Security Justification
compelling
a
national security comprises
Although
governmental interest worthy of protection, 99 the original fears
that led to broad restrictions on alien ownership are no longer
applicable. Technological advances have removed the danger that
a broadcaster could use transmission facilities to interfere with
the military's lines of communication as was done before World
War . I 00 As technology has advanced, so should views of the
threats to national security.

One can use other measures to protect this country's
One
interests without having to resort to a broad ban.
is
to
I,
War
World
during
threats
address
to
used
alternative,
of
transmission
stop
or
temporarily
seize
to
permit the President
security.
national
broadcasting facilities if they interfere with
Although this may not be the most desirable option, the
provisions that would allow the President to adopt such measures
investors would face if they were forced to restructure Fox, and the decade long
19-28.
history of Fox's broadcasting and service to the community. Id.
33-37.
Id.
97.
Id. 34.
98.
See, e.g., Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (finding that
99.
the government's compelling interest in preserving national security may justify
withholding sensitive information).
See Cryan, supra note 7, at 381-87 (discussing technological advances
100.
in the area of radio broadcasting); Rose, supra note 35, at 1201-03 (discussing
the greater availability of broadcasting frequencies).
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are already in place under Section 606 of the Communications
Act of 1934.101
Another possible justification for the current regulations

would be to protect the independence and cultural integrity of the
United States. Proponents of this argument suggest that the
restrictions are necessary to prevent a foreign country from
broadcasting its own anti-U.S. messages in an effort to promote
its agenda and to erode support for the U.S. government at
home.' 0 2 Although this raises some interesting issues, this
argument directly conflicts with the established U.S. policy of
promoting free speech.' 0 3 The U.S. system operates under the
assumption that all viewpoints should have an equal opportunity
to be aired, so that the people can listen to the arguments and
0 4
evaluate the positions for themselves.'
101.
"Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a threat
of war, or a state of public peril or disaster or other national emergency, or in
order to preserve the neutrality of the United States, the President, If he deems it
necessary in the interest of national security or defense, may suspend or amend,
for such time as he may see fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all
stations ... within the jurisdiction of the United States... and may cause the
closing of any station for radio [or television broadcasting]... or he may authorize
the use or control of such station." 47 U.S.C. § 606(c). The President is also
authorized to use the armed forces to prevent any obstructions of necessary
communication. 47 U.S.C. § 606(b).
While Presidential seizures are not necessarily desirable, history has shown
that the President would probably not need to resort to this drastic measure. In
fact, if today's technology was available at the time of World War 1, the President
would not have needed to seize the two German broadcast facilities.
102.
Regulating foreign ownership for the purpose of inhibiting a foreign
entity's viewpoint would amount to a content-based restriction on speech and
should be reviewed by a court under strict scrutiny. For a discussion of the
constitutionality of such a regulation. see Rose. supra note 35.
103.
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
104.
See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (stating
that "informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon
misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free
press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern."); Carter, supra note
34, at 584; Powe, supra note 33, at 40. Allowing a foreign entity to express its
views on an issue is not significantly different from allowing a political party, that
is not in power, to express its disagreement and disgust with the course that the
government Is taking.
In 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was presented with
an intriguing, yet frivolous claim that the Constitution provided a right for
American citizens to be free of foreign owned or controlled media. Young v.
Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co., 939 F.2d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 1991). In this case,
involving the acquisition of MCA motion pictures by Matsushita, a Japanese
company, the Second Circuit Court wrote:
Appellants' complaint seeks to assert a right of national citizenship
protecting essential features of the national government, among them an
allegedly inherent right to receive information on national Issues by means
of mass media not accountable to foreign-owned or foreign-controlled
entities. Appellants cite no case in support of their expansive concept of
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Some have expressed the view that foreigners could attempt
to distort actual events in order to make their point. If that is the
case, there are other, much less restrictive means of preventing
the dissemination of misleading information than completely
shutting the door to outside influences. 10 5 In addition, the
diversity of choice that exists in the broadcasting arena
drastically reduces the risk that any one broadcaster could have a
substantial impact. 10 6 Therefore, this rationale cannot justify
keeping the current restrictions.
(ii) Fox: Making the Case for Deregulation
While concern about national security could sufficiently
justify government regulation, one must also weigh other
considerations, such as the adverse impact on free trade against
this interest.' 0 7 The current regulations on foreign investment
are protectionist legislation aimed at preventing foreign
broadcasters from gaining any meaningful share of the U.S.
market. 10 8 The superiority of the technology and programming of

national-citizenship rights. We decline the invitation to Issue such a
decision.... The alleged right of U.S. citizens to receive communications
through domestic media that are not subject to foreign control does not
remotely resemble any extant right of national citizenship, all of which
involve matters "connected with the powers or the duties of the national
government."
Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
105. For instance, libel and slander laws would act as a deterrent to the
spread of malicious lies.
106.
See Dennis, supra note 13, at 155 (stating that the "marketplace of
ideas" would act as a protector against harmful foreign broadcasts). Although one
may be able to publish a harmful position on one station, there are thousands of
other stations for the government or any other interested party to counter that
position with its own view of the truth.
107.
For instance, in the famous Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court
allowed the New York Times and the Washington Post to publish the "sensitive"
information concerning the Vietnam War over the government's national security
objections because of the newspapers' First Amendment interests. New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Although the interest in
promoting free trade Is not nearly as strong as the First Amendment justifications
found in New York Times Co. v. United States, the claim of a national security
justification was also much stronger in the later case. Therefore, the principles
behind New York Tines v. United States cannot be distinguished merely by the
differences in the competing interest. The inherent strength or weakness of the
government's claim must also be considered in determining which of the
competing interests should prevail.
108.
Foreigners do have some access to the American market. Like those
without a broadcast license, they can purchase air-time to run advertisements,
and they can pressure the networks into running their products and shows. This
access is limited by the fact that they must expend money and effort every time a
foreigner wants to show one of their productions in the United States. As a result
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U.S. broadcasters, however, suggests that the industry does not

need such substantial protection. 10 9 In fact, this superiority is
one of the chief reasons cited for other countries' refusals to allow
U.S. companies into their markets. 11 0 Removing the unnecessary
barriers to a foreign investor in the United States would result in
a gain of many of the traditional benefits associated with a free
market. There would be an increase in competition leading to
better products, more choices, and increased efficiency.
Fox Television's emergence as the fourth major network
underscores some of the advantages that will result from
111
This new forum benefits viewers,
increased competition.
producers of television shows, 1 2 advertisers, 1 3 network
116
5
affiliates, 114 UHF stations, 11 and other "source" industries.

of the delay and expense, foreigners simply cannot compete in the broadcasting
market in the United States. See Dennis, supra note 13, at 154.
109. This superiority is demonstrated by the extremely limited success of
foreign programming in the United States. Less than two percent of television
programming comes from abroad. Foreign films have not met with much success
either. See Id.
110.
See Brown, supra note 17, at 117 (citing the Canadian government's
fear of U.S. programming running rampant in the Canadian broadcasting market):
The Honorable Donald S. Macdonald, The CanadianCulturalIndustries Exemption
Under Canada-U.S. Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253, 254 (1994) (presenting
statistics showing the success of American broadcasters in Canada); Konigsberg,
supra note 23, at 284; Kaplan, supra note 11, at 255, 262, 269-71 (observing that
European television has been dominated by reruns of American programming
such as the Cosby Show, Hogan's Heroes, and Dynasty, and noting that
Hollywood has an insurmountable economic advantage over its European
counterparts).
111.
Television viewers benefit by having additional choices when deciding
what to watch.
112.
Producers, writers, and actors gain from the increased opportunities to
develop new shows.
In turn, this leads to additional Jobs associated with
producing those shows.
113. Although advertisers are attempting to reach the widest possible
audience, they are more concerned with tailoring their message to those "most
likely to buy their particular product-as distinguished by age, sex, affluence and
so on." VIPOND, supra note 43, at 90. From the additional broadcasting forum,
advertisers gain more opportunities to direct their goods at particular audiences,
and more bargaining power when dealing with the three networks that have
monopolized the broadcasting industry in the United States for so many years.
As the amount of available air-time increases, the cost to the potential purchasers
decrease, thereby making time slots more accessible to smaller businesses.
114. The interests of the network affiliate stations must also be considered
since they too can go elsewhere. The New Orleans television market, where three
stations switched their affiliations at the end of 1995, is a perfect example of what
can happen. Just because a station may have been with a network such as ABC
for thirty years does not mean that they will never change. Ronette King, Loose
Ties Bind Networks, Stations; Affiliation Pact Only Temporary, TiMES-PIcAYUNE (New

Orleans), Dec. 31, 1995, atA8.
115. In reApplcaton of Fox Television Systems, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995 WL
447416 (F.C.C. 1995) (separate statement of Commissioner James H. Quello).
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attention. 1 17
separate
deserve
broadcasters
Minority
"Economists have demonstrated that the neglect of minority
tastes occurs in any industry in which monopoly or monopolistic
Minorities primarily benefit from the
competition exists." 1 18
increased broadcasting opportunities from this new network. 1 19
In fact, one commissioner of the FCC has said that, "Fox has
provided a national platform for minority producers, writers,
actors, and other members of the creative community." 120 With
the introduction of foreign investment and the corresponding
increase in the number of broadcasting stations, minority
opportunities for both viewers and broadcasters should continue
to improve.
Easing current broadcast restrictions will increase foreign
presence in the market. The first noticeable change would be an

influx of new capital.

Given the broadcasting

companies'

The increased competition also results in a shifting of profits away
116.
from the major networks and towards other industries. An example of this can be
seen in the tremendous increase in the amount of money paid by the networks for
major sporting events. With one more bidder available, the price that is paid has
increased. As CBS learned the hard way, by losing its contract for NFL football to
Fox, the three major networks can no longer be complacent towards their existing
clients. Now, the networks must consider the interests of those producing shows
or face the realistic possibility that the producers will go elsewhere.
117.
Recognizing the advantages of diversity in views, the FCC, at the
direction of the U.S. Congress, and with the blessing of the U.S. Supreme Court,
employed affirmative action measures to increase minority representation and to
Metro
decrease the monopolistic nature of the broadcasting industry.
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Writing for the Court in
upholding these policies, Justice Brennan wrote "[j]ust as a 'diverse student body'
contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally permissible goal'
on which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated, the
diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves important First
Amendment values." Id. at 568 (citing Regents of University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). The validity of these
policies, however, is now in doubt. After a shift in the majority, the Supreme
Court overruled Metro Broadcasting in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct 2097 (1995), when it adopted strict scrutiny as the test for race-based
Because Bakke's reasoning, that diversity can be a
preference programs.
compelling interest in some circumstances such as education, has also come
under fire, see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), whether or not

diversity in broadcasting is a compelling interest, given the uniqueness of the
industry and the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, Metro Broadcasting, 497
U.S. at 566 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)),
is, now, an open question.
118.
VIPOND, supra note 43, at 90.
119.
In re Fox, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995 WL 447416 (separate statement of
Commissioner James H. Quello). Surprisingly, the NAACP opposed the renewal of
10-12.
Fox's licenses. Id.
120.
Id. (separate statement of Commissioner James H. Quello).
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constant need for new sources of capital, this would be a welcome
12 1
change for the industry.
2. Other Countries Utilizing the Percentage Method: Canada and
Australia
Like the United States, Canada has opted to use the
percentage method to control foreign investment in its
broadcasting industry in an effort "to safeguard, enrich and
strengthen the cultural, political, social, and economic fabric of
Canada." 12 2 Originally, via the 1958 Broadcasting Act, the
Canadian government attempted to create a "comprehensive
broadcasting service of a high standard that is basically Canadian
in content and character." 12 3 Thus, the 1958 Act imposed a
foreign ownership limit of twenty-five percent of the stock of the
licensee, with the additional requirement that the chairman and
two-thirds of the licensee's board be Canadian citizens. 124 In
1968, in an effort "to preserve and strengthen the political, social,
and economic fabric of Canada," the present set of restrictions
were enacted. 125 The Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1968, which
continues in effect with the adoption of the 1991 Broadcasting
Act, expressly limits direct foreign ownership to twenty percent of
a licensed broadcaster, with a requirement that all members of
the board be Canadian citizens. 126 The remaining eighty percent
of the licensee may be owned by a "qualified corporation."'12 7 By
definition, a "qualified corporation" is one whose ownership is at
least two-thirds Canadian.' 28 A foreign investor could, in effect,
gain a forty-six and two-thirds percent ownership share of a
Canadian licensee by directly owning the statutory maximum of
twenty percent and by obtaining indirect ownership through the

121. The success of the Fox network shows the advantages of new capital.
As a direct result of the new network, there has been a revitalization of UHF
stations. Id.
122. R.S.C. ch. B-11 § 3 (1978) (Can.) cited In Brown supra note 17, at 114
n.7. American domination of the Canadian market is the specific Justification
often presented for Canada's regulatory policies. For statistics on the dominance
of the U.S. media in Canada, see Macdonald, supra note 110. at 254.
123. Coffey, supra note 17, at 417 (quoting Broadcasting Act, Can. Stat. ch.
22, § 10 (1958)).

124.
125.

Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 420.

126. 376 C.R.C. §§ 2-4 (1978) (Can.); Coffey, supra note 17, at 422. See
Kowall, supra note 5, at 348 (noting that the Broadcasting Act, ch. 11, 1991 S.C.

117 (Can.), embodies the regulations of the 1968 Act).
127. 376 C.R.C. §§ 2-4 (1978).
128. Grant Buckler, Smart 95 -Canadian Telecom Liberalization Continues,
NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Sept. 15, 1995, available In LEXS, Market Library,
lacnws File.
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maximum one-third share of the qualified corporation. 129

The

regulations, however, do have one additional protection.

The

to obtain a
Canadian government will not allow a corporation
130
license if it is effectively controlled by foreigners.
Australia follows a similar approach. Its regulations limit the
"company interest" that an individual foreigner can own in a
commercial television broadcasting station to fifteen percent and
limit total company interest held by foreign investors to twenty
percent. 13 1 In addition, a foreigner cannot exercise control of a
broadcasting license, but a broadcaster may have up to twenty
13 2 Although
percent of its director positions held by foreigners.
the exact meaning of "company interest" is uncertain, the intent
seems clear that one cannot exceed the foregoing thresholds.
Although the Australian-based News Corporation was able to
obtain a license to broadcast in the United States, 1 33 restrictions
such as these indicate that the reverse cannot happen without a
change in Australian law. Although many other countries follow
regulations do not
some variation of the percentage method,13their
4
materially differ from the samples above.
3. The Percentage Method: Pros and Cons
The percentage method, including the de facto ownership
limits, is effective in keeping foreign investors out of the business
of broadcasting. Policy benefits attributable to this approach

include those that inure to a policy of exclusion, such as greater
security and less opportunity for subversive messages. On the
down side, such an approach compromises diversity of opinions
In addition, countries following the
and freedom of speech.
percentage method have only limited access to foreign capital.
Further, while appearing to draw a bright line, this approach
In order to determine
is administratively difficult to apply.
compliance under any of the percentage method regulations, the
authority charged with regulating the broadcasting industry must
undertake an intensive study of the licensee as well as anyone

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
376 C.R.C. §§ 2-4 (1978).
Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, 110 § 57 (Austrl.).
Id. §§ 57-58.
See In re Application of Fox Television Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995

WL 447416 (F.C.C. 1995).

134. For instance, Poland sets a maximum foreign ownership limit at 33%.
Polish Law on Radio Television Broadcasting, 1993 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE-NTIS
CENTRAL & EAsTERN EUROPE LEGAL TExTs, Jan. 29, 1993, article 35.2.
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with a significant interest in that licensee. This results in a time135
consuming case-by-case analysis.
Finally, selection of an appropriate limit on foreign
ownership, in order to protect the countries legitimate interests,
results in the setting of an arbitrary line. As demonstrated by the
three examples above, countries do not agree on an appropriate
limit. One difficulty encountered in setting foreign ownership
limits is that there is no clear demarcation of what percentage of
ownership will result in control over the license. For instance, a
ten percent stake in a large corporation may give a shareholder
control, whereas a larger share of a smaller corporation may
result in a minority position only. This difficulty, however, has
been lessened by employing restrictions aimed at de facto
ownership.
B. The Friendly Nation Approach: The EuropeanCommunity
Another philosophy of regulation that has gained popularity
in recent years is that of lowering the restrictions imposed upon
citizens of "friendly" countries, 1 3 6 while leaving the barriers up for

all others.1 3 7 This result is achieved through the use of free-trade

135. See, e.g., In re Fox, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995 WL 447416 (finding that
Fox was a foreign-owned business more than ten years after Fox first received its
license to broadcast).
136. A nation is considered "friendly" when it has reached agreement with
other nations to treat each others citizens as they would treat their own.

137.

England's Broadcasting Act of 1990 Is an example of how foreigners,

other than those from countries which are party to a free-trade treaty are
excluded. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
(1)

The Commission shall do all that they can to secure(a)
that a person does not become or remain the holder of a
license if he is a person who is a disqualified person in relation to
that license by virtue of Part II of Schedule 2 to this Act.

Broadcasting Act of 1990. ch. 42, part I. chapter I, § 5 (Eng.).
(1)
Subject to sub-paragraph (2). the following persons are disqualified
persons in relation to a license granted by the Commission or the
Authority(a)
an individual who is neither(i)
a national of a member State who is ordinarily resident within
the European Economic Community, nor
()
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man or
the Channel Islands;
(b) a body corporate which is neither(I)
a body formed under the law of a member State which has its
registered or head office or principal place of business within the
European Economic Community, nor
(ii)
a body incorporated under the law of the Isle of Man or the
Channel Islands;
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treaties. The European Community (EC) members have used this
approach in developing a system of regulation that generally
allows free access to the broadcast industry to investors from
other member states.138 The drafters of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) declined to follow the EC's lead when
13 9
they exempted broadcasting from its coverage.
1. The EC: Opening Broadcasting Markets for Member States
The EC provides a common market throughout Europe with

few territorial barriers between member states. 140

This

liberalization of restrictions included lowering the barriers to
foreign investment in the broadcasting industries of member
states.' 4 1 England's Broadcasting Act of 1990, which treats
nationals of EC states the same as its own citizens with respect to
eligibility for a broadcasting license, is illustrative of this
liberalization. 1 4 2 By treating the citizens of other member states
as equal to its own, England's Broadcasting Act of 1990 has
effectively removed barriers to investment by citizens of EC
member states.
The treaty also allows foreign broadcasters to make
transnational broadcasts.14 3 This right to transmission, however,
is not without restriction. The EC's Court of Justice has ruled
that a country may restrict the broadcasts in some ways, such as
prohibiting the use of paid advertisements, as long as those
restrictions are not employed as a means of discriminating
14 4
against citizens of another member state.
Restrictions that are discriminatory are allowed when they
145
are based on "public policy, public security or public health."
"Broadly speaking, the 'public policy' exception can be invoked
only where there exists a genuine and sufficiently serious threat
to one of the fundamental interests in society.' '146 Because this
exception departs from the stated goal of an open system, it is
subject to the following qualifications: "(1) it may not be used to
serve economic ends... (2) it must be interpreted in such a way
that its effects are limited to that which is necessary in order to

Broadcasting Act of 1990, ch. 42, sched. 2, part II (Eng.).
138. See WINN, supranote 55, at 57-65.
139. Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 284; Vannoy, supra note 23, at 310.

140.
141.

WINN, supranote 55, at 51.
Id. at 51-52.

142.

Broadcasting Act of 1990, ch. 42, sched. 2, Part II (Eng.).

143. WINN, supranote 55, at 57.
144. Id. at 61-62 (citing Procureurdu Rol v. Debauve. Case 52/79 [1980]
ECR 833, [1981] 2 CMLR 362).

145.

Id. at 63.

146.

Id.
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protect the interests it seeks to safeguard . . . (3) it must be

interpreted strictly... [and 4] fundamental human rights must
be taken into account." 147 The Court of Justice has found that
limitations on the number of broadcasting frequencies available
does not constitute, in itself, a sufficient justification for
148
discriminating against broadcasters from other member states.
The frequency limitations, however, do entitle the member
countries to impose licensing requirements upon broadcasters,
provided that this licensing is not merely a sham to avoid other
treaty provisions. 149 Members of the EC can also refuse to license
private broadcasters when seeking to preserve the government's
monopoly on broadcasting.150 Finally, content restrictions have
been imposed to ensure that a majority of the broadcasting
material is local in scope.151

In sum, the EC has created a
relatively open system of broadcasting within the confines of the

treaty's reach.
2. Evaluation of the EC Model
The friendly-nation approach offers many advantages over
the relatively more restrictive percentage method. By lowering
barriers to some nations, a country can gain the advantages of an
open system. Under this system, however, the opening of the
industry is controlled. 15 2 While the home country will benefit
from the new sources of programming and capital, as well as a
147.
Id. at 63-64.
148.
Id. at 65.
149.
Id. at 178.
150. Id. at 179-80.
151.
Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers:
Opportunity and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13
HASTINGS INTVL & CoMp. L. REv. 495, 499-501 (1990). This was done as a means
of ensuring that broadcasting material was of European origin. Id. Without the
restriction, a European broadcaster could have purchased a U.S.-made program,
and distributed it freely throughout Europe.
In the recent Uruguay round of negotiations for the GATT, the United States
strongly challenged the use of content-based restrictions in the EC as being a
violation of the terms and spirit of GATT. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 303. The
U.S. position was that, "culture is a market phenomenon: laissez-faire [is) the
best and only strategy for dealing with it." That the United States would take
such a position is logical since U.S. culture tended to predominate in an open
market; as Kaplan noted, "[clulture happened in U.S. terms." Id. By failing to

resolve the issue of cultural exemptions at the Uruguay round, the European
position scored "a clear political victory for the EC and for proponents of cultural
protectionism." Id. at 343.
152.
"Perhaps the best one can say about privileged entry is that it permits
society and other parts of the media system to adjust gradually to a more open

system. Another positive aspect of privileged entry is that it is generally more
palatable to opponents of openness in television, who tend to believe that the less
there is of it, the better." Noam & Domonkos, supranote 36, at 651.
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larger forum for speakers, it will also have the security of being
able to adopt reasonable limits, such as licensing requirements,
to maintain some semblance of order in the industry. If the

broadcasts from a particular country threaten national security,
the home country can choose not to enter into a treaty with the
"unfriendly" nation. 15 3 The end result is a reasonable balance
between the maximization of free speech and the minimization of
the threats to national security.
The EC's treaty provides an additional feature that makes it
attractive to nations with developing broadcasting industries.
Any country with a purely state-owned broadcasting system is not
obligated to open its industry to foreigners.' 5 4 Any country that
falls within this exception has the strongest justification for
agreeing to a treaty modeled after the EC's system. Without
giving up the integrity of its own broadcasting industry, that
country could secure the economic benefits from the deregulation
in other countries for its own citizens who wish to invest in those
markets. This potential for abuse constitutes one downside for
adopting a global treaty modeled after the EC's system.
The major drawback to the friendly-nation approach consists
of persuading other countries to agree upon a treaty. Procedural
difficulties associated with the ratification of a treaty present an
initial problem. For instance, in the United States, a treaty will
be ratified only after it has been negotiated by the President and
55
approved by two-thirds of the members of the Senate.
Factoring in the procedural difficulties that would be encountered
in the other nations makes the goal of creating a global treaty
appear almost impossible.
This difficulty is amplified further by the recent failure of the
United States to include the broadcasting industry in the
relaxation of trade barriers under NAFTA, due to the inability to
ease Canadian concerns that U.S. broadcasters could dominate
the Canadian market.' 5 6 Obtaining the goal of a uniform, global
system of regulation would not only require a reconciliation of
differences with Canada, but would also require finding common

ground with all the major industrialized nations. In an area such
as broadcasting, where countries are very protective of their

153. Using a treaty as a means of strengthening an industry among several
nation-participants while excluding another dominating force is not new. In fact,
a major goal of the EC's lowering of its barriers with respect to each other, but not
to the United States, was to give the European industries a chance to strengthen
while forcing a decrease in the pace of the "Americanization" of Europe.
Konigsberg, supranote 23. at 302.
154. Id.
155. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
156. Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 284.
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borders, finding this
common ground through negotiations is
5 7
virtually impossible.1

C. Reciprocity as a System of Regulation
The concept of "reciprocity" has become a popular solution
158
for those advocating liberalization of foreign trade barriers.
Reciprocity is a "term used to denote the relation existing between
two states when each of them gives the subjects of the other
certain privileges, on condition that its own subjects shall enjoy
similar privileges at the hands of the latter state."15 9 In the arena
of broadcasting ownership restrictions, reciprocity means
lowering the ownership restrictions by country A only for the
citizens of those countries that lower barriers to the citizens of
country A. One can accomplish this type of regulatory policy
either by the use of treaties 60 or by enacting legislation that
automatically lowers restrictions to citizens of countries that have
similarly reduced their barriers. 1 1 The first method, which Is
essentially what the EC achieved by enacting their regulations,
was analyzed in the previous section. 16 2 Therefore, this section
will focus on the latter method, which will be referred to as the
"pure form."
The upside to the pure form of reciprocity Is both immense
and politically popular. If it works, and countries lower their
barriers in order to trigger the opening of other markets, this
approach will result in vastly increased economic opportunities as
well as many new broadcasting forums for potential speakers to
157. Jonas M. Grant, 'Jurassic'Trade Dispute: The Exclusion of the AudloVisual Sectorfrom the GATT, 70 IND. L.J. 1333, 1335-36 (1995).
158. See Coffey, supra note 17, at 413-28; Konigsberg, supra note 23, at
318-19; Brown. supra note 17, at 224-26.
159.

BLACiS LAW DIcTIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 1990).

160. In a sense, any treaty is a reciprocity agreement. Under a treaty, a
country is agreeing to undertake some activity, such as deregulation, if and only if
the other party to the treaty will agree to undertake its own obligations under the

treaty.
161.

See Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 318-20 (proposing a reciprocity

amendment to the ownership restrictions of the Communications Act of 1934).

This proposed reciprocity amendment, however, is flawed. The new section (f)
would allow the FCC to lower barriers to countries who have a bilateral agreement
with the United States "ifthe Commission finds that the public Interest will be
served by the granting of such a license." Id. at 318. Because the present section
310 allows for a public interest waiver of the indirect control limits, the new
section would not ease the formalities of obtaining a license. While the new
section's application goes beyond the indirect ownership limits, it requires the
administratively burdensome requirement of obtaining a bilateral trade
agreement. In the end, this provision could be counterproductive because it may
result in an additional requirement being added to the public interest waiver that
is currently authorized.
162. See Infra Part II.B.
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express their views. As more nations join in the deregulation, the
global regulatory scheme begins to look like an open system
similar to that of the EC. One feature that makes this a popular
alternative is that such deregulation excludes those who are not
willing to lower their own barriers to outsiders, thereby preventing
163
an opening of the "floodgates" to potential abuse.
Although reciprocity and the friendly-nations approach will
tend to mirror each other in terms of the benefits derived,
differences exist between the two approaches. Reciprocity could
be accomplished without the obstacles of enacting a treaty.
Therefore, it could theoretically be easier to create a global system
using this approach. Under the pure form of reciprocity, however,
there would be no control over selecting the countries that are
able to avail themselves of these lowered restrictions. To gain
entry into new markets, a nation would only need to lower its own
barriers. Under the friendly-nation approach, any undesirable
country could be excluded by refusing to negotiate with that
country. Although this difference could be reconciled by adopting
exceptions to the pure form of reciprocity, such as selectively
excluding certain nations from this preferential treatment, that
reconciliation would run counter to the goals of a global system of
deregulation.
D. EasternEurope: The Desperateand the Uncertain
Legal restrictions on broadcasting in many parts of the world,

such as Eastern Europe and Latin America, are uncertain at
best. 16 4 Although those countries that fall within this category do
not have a uniform system of regulation that can be evaluated to
help form an opinion of the ideal system of regulation, these
underdeveloped markets are likely to be attractive areas for
foreign investment. 165
The ultimate goal of liberalizing the
ownership rules entails finding new markets for expansion.
Because the economic needs of the underdeveloped markets tend
to be the same regardless of their longitude and latitude, for

163. Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 319.
164. See Anne Moebes, Channels of Communication Are Opening in Eastern
Europe, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, 13 (1993) (reviewing the state of
broadcasting in Eastern Europe); Monroe E. Price, Law, Force, and the Russian
Media, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 795 (discussing the mass media in the
former Soviet Union); Vannoy, supra note 23, at 320 (recognizing the "Latin
American
'regulatory complexion" has been
termed
'patchwork and
piecemeal'")(quoting Bruce Wiley, A Latin American Telecommunications Primer;
Telephony in Latin America and Tipsfor Deploying Networks. TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
Mar. 1992, at 45, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Tele File).
165. Moebes, supranote 164, at 7; Vannoy, supra note 23, at 333.
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purposes of analysis, this Note will use Eastern Europe as a
model for discussion.
of
Surprisingly, the Eastern European regulations
broadcasting that have been enacted tend to be liberal. 1 66 Even
though Poland took the lead by enacting a percentage-method
restriction capped at one-third foreign ownership, 16 7 others, such
as the former Czechoslovakia, have opted for no restrictions at
all. 168 The driving force behind these liberal restrictions is a need
for investment capital strong enough to force Russia and others to
turn to U.S. capitalists for assistance. 16 9 Because of these
countries' unwillingness to shut off needed sources of capital,
those countries that have
not addressed the issue will probably
70
adopt relaxed policies. 1
Any global agreement upon a level of broadcasting ownership
restrictions would have little impact in Eastern Europe, because
the need for additional capital will prevail over uniformity.
Therefore, in formulating and achieving a global system of
regulation, these countries, with the possible exception of Poland,
are best viewed as valuable economic opportunities for
broadcasting investors, and not
players whose interests must be
17
taken into account separately.

166. Moebes, supra note 164, at 13. See also Hungarian Bill on Radio and
Television, Art. 123, reprinted In 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 449, 498-99
(proscribing regulations for foreign control broadcasters).
167 Moebes, supra note 164, at 20.
168. Id. at 10.
169. See Bazyler & Sadovoy, supra note 12, at 444-45 (discussing the use of
American programming and news sources such as CNN by both private and
government run broadcasters as a means of reducing costs). Although Russia is
willing to accept assistance, it is not ready to completely open the door to
foreigners. Russia will not grant a license to establish a mass media outlet to a
foreign citizen or to anyone living outside its borders. Price, supra note 164, at
800.
170. Moebes, supra note 164, at 7.
171. Not only are these markets attractive for potential investors in the
broadcasting industry, they are also opportunities for investment in several other
communication-based industries, since, unlike the United States before the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Eastern European countries do not have
substantial barriers affecting expansion into those other fields. Id. at 13.
However, investors must remember the dangers associated with these areas
which include financial barriers and political instability. Id. at 16, 26.
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IV. AN OPEN SYSTEM: ACHIEVING THE IDEAL

A. The Ideal System: Global Relaxation with Security
Now that the various alternatives have been presented, the
goal shifts to selecting the best approach either individually or in
combination with others, for a world-wide system. As mentioned
previously, the goal is to maximize free speech and economic
opportunities, while minimizing the threats to national security,
territorial independence, and cultural integrity. No single system
is best for achieving each of these goals. Instead, the optimal
approach is the one that balances these policies in the most
favorable way. In the end, the ideal is a modified version of
172
reciprocity.
The
regulatory
scheme
that
maximizes
economic
opportunities and free expression is one with few barriers to
market participants. Because of the need to preserve the integrity
of the broadcasting spectrum, this type of scheme would include
licensing rules to allocate only broadcasting frequencies. The

rules would not constitute a means of discriminating against
unwanted speakers or groups such as foreign investors. Unlike
the percentage method, which is exclusionary by nature, the
reciprocity-based approaches come close to this goal. In theory,
reciprocity welcomes or invites all those who wish to participate to
open their own industries.
A system which reduces the chances for airing unwanted
threats, ideas and opinions further national security, territorial
independence, and cultural integrity.
Total government
domination of the communications industries best promotes these
goals.
Because such an alternative is unthinkable in a
democratic society such as the United States, the most feasible
alternative is the percentage method approach.
Balancing reciprocity against the percentage method could
lead to an endless political policy discussion since each has merit.
But, from a planning perspective, there is a fortunate break. One
can modify these systems to achieve a better alternative. For
instance, one could alter the percentage method by lowering
barriers on foreign investment to gain additional economic
benefits. 17 3 This process, however, would become artificial since

172. For commentators
arguing for the use of reciprocity
in
communications industries, see Coffey, supra note 17, at 413-28; Konigsberg,
supra note 23, at 318-19; Brown, supra note 17, at 224-26.
173. For commentary on this approach, see Kowall, supra note 5. at 358
(advocating the raising of the ownership limits to between 30 and 49 percent to
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it would lead to the conclusion that alm6st any additional raising
of the maximum allowable foreign ownership percentage will be
beneficial from an economic standpoint. Therefore, the proper
starting place for constructing the ideal is from the open-end,
reciprocity.
Reciprocity calls for no barriers to investors from countries
who are willing to remove their own restrictions.
The
modifications needed for this system are those that will protect
national security and independence. 1 7 4 One alternative is to
move towards the treaty-based approach. As explained above,
however, this approach is unworkable from a practical
standpoint. Two modifications to the reciprocity approach that
would work include selective exclusion and emergency executive
authority.
Selective exclusion, which targets certain nations that do not
deserve favorable treatment, is the polar opposite of negotiating a
treaty with those countries to whom regulations will be lowered.
This exclusion requires the suppression of broadcasting influence
175
from nations that are determined to be hostile or threatening.
Although this approach can be effective at reducing threats, it has
two fatal flaws. First, suppressing a message or a speaker runs

counter to the goal of free speech.

Second, recognition of a

significant threat would often occur too late for the exclusion to
be effective.
Therefore, this alternative is not the favorable
76
solution. 1
Modifying reciprocity to include emergency executive
authority over foreigners in the broadcast industry is an effective
means of protecting national security and independence. This
would allow the executive to take measures necessary to prevent
physical interference with security, such as by blocking or
intercepting sensitive military communications, but would not
extend to censoring anti-government messages. Not only would
this method work, a comparable provision is already in place in
the United States. 177 With the additional security safeguard, an

allow for more foreign investment capital to enter the Canadian broadcast
market).
174. These additional protections are aimed at threats to national security
such as interference with military broadcasts and other sensitive governmental
activity. They are not aimed at controlling speakers and their messages because
that would be a clear violation of the protection accorded to free speech in many

countries including the United States.
175. Active involvement in terrorism is one example of a reason for the
exclusion of a nation.
176. Selective exclusion is not the answer for protecting national security or
silencing particular speakers. This process may, however, have valid uses such
as forcing others to open their industries to outsiders. Therefore, selective
incorporation may be useful as a means of preventing abuse.
177. See 47 U.S.C. § 606.

1996]

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF BROADCASTING

open system modeled upon reciprocity is the ideal end for worldwide regulation. Identifying this goal is the easy part. The
difficulty arises in achieving the goal.
B. The United States: The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 as
Proposedby the Senate
The U.S. Congress enacted the 1996 Act as a response to a
need for reform in the communications industry. 178 The 1996
Act, however, has done little to change the present regulations on
foreign ownership of broadcasters. 17 9 Although early versions of
the legislation looked promising for meaningful reform in this
area,18 0 such hopes died in the House-Senate Conference to
reconcile differences in their respective bills.' 8 ' A brief look at the
proposed changes that were deleted from the legislation (as
enacted) is still warranted because it garnered enough support to
pass the Senate. With this support, it is conceivable that the
proposal will be introduced again in the near future.
Before the Conference Committee acted on the legislation, the
Senate version of the 1996 Act included an amendment to Section
310 that would have provided a reciprocity-based exclusion to the
restrictive percentage method approach of Section 310(b). 18 2 This
amendment would have moved the U.S. regulations into a
"hybrid" state. By amending Section 310 to allow the Commission
to reciprocate in lowering foreign ownership barriers (when the
President has determined that it is necessary under an
international trade agreement), the Senate would, in effect, have
authorized the Commission only to meet U.S. treaty
Therefore, while this proposed amendment
obligations. 18 3
approach, it was not the "pure
a
reciprocity-based
of
consisted
through the use of
reciprocity
for
called
it
Instead,
form."
discussed above.
approach
friendly-nation
the
to
similar
treaties,
Similar to the system in the EC, no restrictions would be lowered
until the United States and another country went through the
difficult process of negotiating a trade agreement. At final glance,
this proposed amendment might be best characterized as Senate
approval of the friendly-nation approach. Because of Canadian
reluctance to enter into such a treaty, 1 8 4 European fears of
178.
179.

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
§402, 110Stat. at 120.

180. S. 652, 104th Cong., § 303 (1995) (Version 4) (not enacted). This
recommendation.
legislation closely resembles Konigsberg's
proposed
Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 318-20.
141 CONG. REc. Hi137 (Jan. 31, 1996).
181.
182. S. 652. 104th Cong., § 303 (1995).
183. Id.
184. Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 284.
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"Americanization," 18 5 and the failed attempts at including the
communications industry in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), 18 6 this amendment would not have had any
practical effect in the near future.
In the end, the failure to secure passage of this amendment
was a defeat in name only, because the provisions would have
been ineffective. A vast majority of the Senate has nevertheless

recognized the need to change the current draconian restrictions

on foreign investment.
C. Reaching the Goal of a Global, Open Market

Now that there is a recognition of the goal of an open market
based upon the principles of reciprocity, the question is how to
achieve that goal.18 7 Answers to this question fall into two
schools.'l 8
One view is that reciprocity consists of a selfachieving system.' 8 9 The other is that one country, such as the
United States, must affirmatively take the lead in lowering the
0
wall of protectionism.'

9

Reciprocity could be a self-achieving system in many
industries where an outsider could enter the market with the
expectation of being able to compete with existing businesses. In
the broadcasting industry, however, foreigners have little reason
to believe that they can compete against U.S. broadcasters
because of the superiority of U.S. broadcasting technology and
the quality of its produced shows. 19 1 Therefore, if the United
185. Id. at 302. Article 4 of the EC's "Television Without Frontiers Directive"
even includes limits on programming based upon the origin of its creation.
Presburger & Tyler, supra note 151, at 499-501.
186.
See Grant, supra note 157, at 1335 (stating that, because of the
leading efforts of France, the audio-visual sector has been excluded from the
GATT).
187.
There is one procedural issue that merits brief discussion: Whose role
is it to regulate or change the regulations on foreign ownership? If there was any
doubt about the answer, that doubt was resolved by the Second Circuit Court in
Young v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 939 F.2d 19, 20 (1991), discussed supra
note 105. The court wrote that "[tihe right appellants ask us to create is
paradigmatically one for the legislative branch.
As Section 310 of the
Communications Act of 1934 illustrates, it belongs properly to Congress, if it
chooses, to regulate . . . the communications media. . . . [W]e decline the
invitation to undertake such regulation." Id.
188.
"The real issue is reciprocity, or equivalency, whatever you want to call
it. Now, should we follow that approach, or do we open out markets and hope
that others will follow?" Dennis, supra note 13, at 157.
189.
See, e.g., Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 318-20 (arguing for a
reciprocity-based amendment to § 3 10(b) to encourage the lowering of barriers in
other countries).
190. See Cryan, supra note 7, at 404 (arguing that the United States should
take the lead in lowering investment barriers in the radio broadcasting industry).
191. See Dennis, supra note 13, at 154.
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States merely enacted a reciprocity amendment to its foreign
ownership restrictions, without taking additional proactive

measures, there is little evidence that any other country would be
willing to lower its barriers first.
Since other nations are not likely to take the initiative of
easing restrictions, a global relaxation of broadcasting ownership
restrictions can be achieved only if- the United States takes the
lead by lowering its own restrictions.1 9 2 Although an immediate,
reciprocal response by others is unlikely, 193 time and patience
can bring about the desired end. If the U.S. market is open to
outsiders, U.S. broadcasters will become increasingly global
entities as more foreigners invest in them. In turn, this will
create new pressures on other countries to open their own
markets to these companies that are partially owned by its own
citizens. 19 4 This internal pressure has a far greater chance at
192. Besides a majority of the United States Senate, Rep. Mike Oxley, Rep.
Jack Fields, and at least one other commentator agrees that the time has come
for the repeal of the ownership restrictions of § 310(b). Henry Geller "believe[s]
that such reform [as the repeal of § 310(b)] is sound and long overdue." Geller,
supra note 9, at 749.
Although this point is likely to infuriate many Americans, provoking cries to
"remember Detroit and the automobile industry," as Toyota was invading, or a
renewed discussion of H. Ross Perot and the "giant sucking sound" heard as
American jobs headed south across the U.S.-Mexican border, these fears are
unwarranted in the broadcasting arena. Even in a global broadcasting industry,
broadcasters will always remain somewhat local by necessity. Imagine the
obstacles that would be encountered by the network news, for instance, if they
did not have strong enough Community presence to obtain the sources upon
which their broadcasts rely.
After factoring in language barriers, local prejudices, and the many other
obstacles that would be encountered in an attempt to completely invade or
relocate a country's broadcast media, it is clear that a globalization of the
industry would not eliminate the need for employees on the local level. In the
end, after the ownership interests have reshuffled and the markets have
experienced the benefits of renewed competition and more diversity, those
individuals that rely upon the broadcasters for their livelihoods will still have their
source of income. In fact, with the addition of more broadcasting networks, it is
likely that more local employees will be needed.
193. It has long been recognized that "[r]eciprocity of open, competitive
markets remains a major impedient to a deregulated international
communications market". Sean P. Farrell, Note, Telecommunications in the United
Kingdom: A Prototypefor Deregulationor a Flash In the Pan? 18 HASTINGS COMM &
ENT L.J. 321, 330 (1996). In order to overcome this reluctance to reciprocate in
lowering restrictions, there must be an incentive.
194. The idea of using cooperation and diversification of ownership to gain
access to new markets is not new. The use of joint ventures, for instance, has
been advocated as a means for the United States to retain a meaningful presence
in the European broadcasting market by circumventing the EC restrictions on
foreign-created programming. See Anne Moebes, Structuring Media Joint Ventures
in the European Community, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 3-7 (1991). See
also Konigsberg, supra note 23, at 314-15 ("Encouraging foreign investment in
U.S. broadcast entities would allow dissemination of those uniquely Canadian
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removing the ownership barriers than any outside influence could
ever hope to achieve.
Time provides another incentive to outsiders. By allowing
them a reasonable opportunity to develop their own broadcasting
industries and to work with U.S. institutes on improving their
facilities, the foreign countries would have a better opportunity to
compete with U.S. companies. Once these nations feel that they
can compete, they are more likely to allow competitors into their
markets. In the end, increased competition, along with the
internal pressure, can cause the walls of protectionism to come
tumbling down, thereby creating a global broadcasting industry.
One final question remains: What should be done about
countries who wish to take advantage of an open U.S. industry,
but refuse to lower their own barriers? In the short term, nothing
should be done. Those nations should be given a reasonable
opportunity to take the necessary steps to comply with new U.S.
regulations. After a reasonable amount of time has passed,
however, the United States should expel the abusers through
selective exclusion.
Under these circumstances, selective
exclusion does not generate the problems described above
because it forces compliance only through economic means. It Is
not used to discriminate against any particular speaker or
message based upon its content. After a country is identified as
an abuser, unwilling to allow others into its own broadcasting
markets, Congress, or maybe even the FCC, could force investors
to divest themselves of their interests in U.S. broadcasting
companies and could require the withdrawal of foreign
broadcasters by refusing to renew their licenses.1 9 5 After this

process has had an opportunity to run its full course, the global
broadcasting regime will resemble reciprocity as the markets open
to all those that have complied by lowering their own restrictions.

Products in the U.S. as well as offer incentives for the Canadian government to
loosen its regulations and potential barriers to foreign cultural trade.").
195. Requiring this withdrawal is easily distinguished from the Fox decision.
In Fox, the FCC renewed the broadcasting license after the Fox Network had been
operating in the United States, with FCC approval, for over a decade based upon
a good-faith understanding of the foreign ownership restrictions. In re Application
of Fox Television Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 5714, 1995 WL 447416 at 123 (F.C.C.
1995). Forcing a withdrawal of foreigners that were abusing the openness of the
U.S. system is different in that these investors were not "Innocent." They have
reason to know that this preferential treatment was subject to their country's
eventual reciprocation in lowering ownership barriers.
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CONCLUSION

Restrictions on foreign investment in the broadcasting
industry have stifled the development of a world wide media
boom. One commentator recently observed that "[wihen Canada,
Mexico, and the United States finally agree to bring basic
telecommunications services into the free trade arena,
opportunities for investment will increase again.' 19 6 But why
stop with these three countries only? Instead, in the spirit of the
new millennium that is soon to come, reformers should "shoot for
the stars." If fate should have it that reform efforts fall a little
short of the ultimate goal, 19 7 merely landing on the moon, so to
speak, would not constitute a failure.
In the end, free trade and investment in the broadcast arena
comprises the ultimate goal. The current focus on reforming
communications law should not end with the 1996 Act, but
rather, should be the beginning. The United States should take
the lead in tearing down the wall of protectionism around the
world by lowering barriers to foreign broadcasters and investors
in order to trigger the opening of markets abroad. By creating
open markets, valuable opportunities will arise for broadcasters
and investors from all over the world. For, "In time we shall
experience a [broadcasting market] of openness, open to the
nonprofit--open across"
access of new voices-commercial and
98
frontiers, and open to viewer choices."
W. Scott Hastings*

196. Vannoy, supra note 23, at 333.
197. Actually "reaching the stars" would require all nations to open their
markets to outside investors. Because there are always stubborn outsiders who
refuse to change their ways, the initial efforts will probably fall short. In the long
run, possibly over a period of decades, these outsiders will realize the benefits
that they are missing and will want to open their markets also.
198. Noam & Domonkos, supra note 36, at 655.
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